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Exonerated, But Not Free: The Prolonged
Struggle for a Second Chance at a Stolen
Life
NEWTON N. KNOWLES*
Introduction
Studies suggest that between 2.3% and 5% of United States
prisoners have been wrongfully convicted.' There is data that shows
that individuals eventually proven innocent through DNA analysis
spend, on average, thirteen-and-a-half years locked away behind bars.
Adding insult to injury, once they have been proven innocent, many
state governments do little to nothing to assist exonerees, whether
through monetary compensation or reentry support programs.3 With
no money, housing, transportation, health services, or insurance, and a
criminal record that is rarely cleared despite proven innocence, the
punishment lingers long after the conviction has been overturned.4
Compensation for people wrongly imprisoned varies widely by state,
and twenty states have no statutory means of compensation at all.'
* Senior Articles Editor, Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal, 2014-2015; J.D.
candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law (2015); B.A., magna cum
laude, John Jay College of Criminal Justice (2011). I would like to thank Professor Lisa
Faigman who offered me guidance and insight in facilitating this important conversation.
I would further like to thank the HRPLJ members and staff for their meticulous and
thoughtful efforts in bringing this Note to publication. Finally, special thanks to my
mother Marva, for always being encouraging and supportive.
1. Kelly Phillips Erb, The Price of Freedom: What Happens to the Wrongfully Convicted?,
Forbes (May 1, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/05/01/the-price-
of-freedom-what-happens-to-the-wrongfully-convicted.
2. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/compensat
ing-the-wrongly-convicted.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Overall, approximately 40% of those released from prison after being
wrongfully convicted and incarcerated receive no compensation for the
miscarriage of justice in their case.6 Among the states that do provide
some form of statutory post-exoneration compensation, the total
capped amounts for the entirety of a compensation claim range from as
little as $20,000 (New Hampshire) 7 and up to $2,000,000 (Florida),8 with
many states imposing restrictions on eligibility.9
Rather than face disenfranchisement upon returning home,
exonerees must be entitled to the restoration of all their civil rights.
The existing platform for which compensation may be achieved is
grossly inadequate to accomplishing the diverse needs of the
wrongfully convicted. This Note advocates for an alternative method
similarly conceived by Professor Cathleen Burnett," however with a
shift in responsibility. Rather than centralize the burden on the
executive branch's responsibilities, an ad hoc regime, including the
coordinated efforts of both judicial and extrajudicial practitioners,
should replace the methods that are currently made available by way
of state statutes, civil lawsuits, or the political process. When the state
or federal government wrongfully convicts an individual, the only
way to ensure due process is with the might of all three coordinated
branches of government. This in turn is why each path to
compensation on its own is ineffective and requires the consolidation
of the various means under a centralized service-based model.
Part I of this Note will discuss a national survey of the various
compensation statutes within the United States and some of the
personal stories of those who have not been compensated for the time
they were incarcerated. Part II will examine the three main avenues
through which victims of wrongful convictions may seek relief, and
the uphill battles they face in each instance. Part III will explore the
challenges of reentry into the community and the lack of programs to
assist in the return home. This Note will conclude by recommending
an alternative compensation model similarly conceived by Professor
Cathleen Burnett, with a slight shift in responsibility, and a look
forward at how an individually tailored solution would work best in
6. Erb, supra note 1.
7. New Hampshire, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-
your-state-doing/NH (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2007).
8. Florida, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-
state-doing/FL (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); see also FLA. STAT. § 961.06(1)(e) (2015).
9. How is Your State Doing?, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
how-is-your-state-doing (last visited Apr. 4,2015).
10. Cathleen Burnett, Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions: A Simple
Proposal, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 272 (2005).
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meeting the many challenges facing persons wrongfully convicted
and incarcerated.
I. A Stolen Life and the National Response
On October 30, 1979, a white grocer named Mickey Cohen was
shot and killed at his convenience store on the South Side of Chicago."
The man who fired the shots had previously asked for Kool-Aid and
had browsed around the store. 2 After the shooting, the perpetrator
went through Cohen's pockets and took approximately $100 from the
cash register before leaving through the front door.' 3 Three regular
customers witnessed the murder, and described the perpetrator as an
African-American man dressed in black.'4 These three witnesses also
noticed that the assailant touched various items with his bare hands. 5
Police arrived, secured the scene, interviewed the witnesses and
dusted for fingerprints.16
About thirty-six hours after the crime occurred, James Newsome
was walking home from a friend's house when the police stopped him
and another friend on an unrelated matter. 7 They were taken into
custody, only later to have the matter cleared up at the station house. 8
However, that did not stop the police from questioning Newsome
further."' In a commonly used tactic of police deception, officers alluded
that they had fingerprints linking Newsome to the murder that occurred
at the South Side convenience store.20 Even though the fingerprints the
police had were not from Newsome, they put him in a lineup, where a
witness identified him as the man who shot Mickey Cohen.2'
Although an innocent person always holds out hope that the system
will deliver justice, that notion quickly fled Newsome's mind when, in
September 1980, he was convicted of murder and armed robbery.22 His
conviction rested on problematic eyewitness testimony.23 These three
11. LOLA VOLLEN & DAVE EGGERS, SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA'S WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED AND EXONERATED, 110 (3rd ed. 2008).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 107, 110.
18. Id. at 111.
19. Id. at 111-12.
20. Id. at 111.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 112-13.
23. Id. at 113.
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eyewitnesses had made prior identifications; blaming Cohen's murder
on persons other than Newsome. 24 Newsome was sentenced to life in
prison and served fifteen years until he was released in 1994.25 It was
discovered in 1989 that the fingerprints the police obtained from the
crime scene matched those of a man named Dennis Emerson, who was
already serving a life sentence for another murder.26  The police,
however, did not reveal this information until 1994, when Newsome's
lawyers obtained a court order requiring the Chicago Police Department
to rerun the fingerprints. 27 After spending almost all of his twenties and
every year of his thirties in prison, James Newsome was finally a free
man.28 Fortunately, Illinois law allowed for compensation of up to
$140,350 for persons wrongfully imprisoned for over fourteen years.29
Additionally, in a 2003 private civil suit, a federal jury awarded
Newsome $1 million per year he was wrongfully incarcerated after
finding that two of the five homicide detectives involved in his case
coaching the eyewitness.3 °
Given the fact that a large number of states do not compensate
those who have been wrongfully convicted,3' James Newsome is
among the lucky ones. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming are the twenty states that do not
offer compensation to exonorees. 32 Consider the case of Joseph Amrine,
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the state of Missouri.33
After exhausting his appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court finally
granted a petition to reconsider. The court rejected the arguments of
Assistant State Attorney General Frank A. Jung, who averred that, even
if actually innocent, a prisoner should be executed if he had a fair trial.34
After seventeen years on death row, Joseph Amrine walked out of
prison a free man.35 Unfortunately for him, Missouri did not have a
24. VOLLEN & EGGERS, supra note 11, at 113
25. Id. at 113, 120.
26. Id. at 118.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 120, 122 (Newsome spent the first 30 days of his "freedom" under home
monitoring until he received a pardon from the governor of Illinois.).
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id.; see also Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003).
3 1. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. See State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665 (1987).
34. VOLLEN & EGGERS, supra note 11, at 310-11; see also State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper,
102 S.W.3d 541 (2003).
35. Id. at 312.
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statute in place providing compensation to the wrongfully convicted.36
Amrine received a fourteen-dollar refund from his inmate account and
was sent on his way.
37
Stories like Amrine's are not uncommon, given that 40% of those
wrongfully convicted are leaving prison today without receiving a
penny in compensation.38 In the states that do make reparations to the
wrongfully imprisoned, compensation varies widely. In some states,
exonerated prisoners receive a fixed award for each year spent inside:
$36,500 in California, $5,000 in Wisconsin, $50,000 in Alabama, $15,000 in
Louisiana, to name a few.39 A former prisoner in Tennessee can claim up
to a total of $1 million and in New Hampshire, claims are capped at
$20,000."o New Jersey bases the amount according to lost income while
incarcerated.41 Louisiana caps compensation at $150,000 irrespective of
the length of time served while other states offer post-release benefits
such as free health care, counseling, and tuition.42 Montana, on the other
hand, offers no financial compensation, providing only for educational
aid, restricted to persons exonerated through DNA testing.43
Some wrongful conviction compensation statutes place restrictions
on eligibility. Nebraska, for example, requires that the wrongfully
convicted person show that he did not commit or suborn perjury,
fabricate evidence, or otherwise make a false statement.44 If the
wrongfully convicted person falsely confessed or pled guilty, he must
show that the confession was coerced.45 Compensation is capped at
$500,000, regardless of time served.46 In New York, the wrongfully
convicted person must show he did not, by his own conduct or cause,
36. Missouri now compensates up to $50 per day of post-conviction confinement subject
to the limitation that only wrongfully convicted persons exonerated through DNA testing are
eligible. See Missouri, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your
-state-doing/MO (last visited Apr. 4,2015).
37. VOLLEN & EGGERS, supra note 11, at 315.
38. Erb, supra note 1; see also VOLLEN & EGGERS, supra note 11, at 315.
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (1987); ALA. CODE § 29-2-
159 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012); see also Erb, supra note 1.
40. Louise Radnofsky, Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(July 24, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/compensating-wrongly-convicted; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9-8-108 (2013); N.H. REV STAT ANN. § 541-B:14 (2007).
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5 (1997).
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012); Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statutes,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/us/table.wrongful.convictions (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015).
43. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 53-1-214 (2003); Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 2.
44. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603 (2009).
45. Id.
46. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4604 (2009).
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bring about his conviction," a provision that may prevent people who
falsely confessed or pled guilty from receiving compensation. Utah
provides for no more than fifteen years of compensation with each
year's monetary equivalent being that of the average annual pay for a
nonagricultural worker,48 while Virginia's statute provides for 90% of
the Virginia per capita personal income for up to twenty years, limited
to those who have not pled guilty unless charged with a capital
offense-any new felony conviction will end the claimant's right to
annual compensation.49
The federal government provides up to $50,000 per year of wrongful
imprisonment and $100,000 per year on death row.5 ' Currently,
however, the compensation paid out may be subject to federal income
taxes, depending on how the compensation is classified. Fairly recently,
Representative Sam Johnson (R) of Texas introduced H.R. 4241, the
Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2012, to exclude any civil
damages, restitution, or other monetary award, including compensatory
or statutory damages and restitution imposed in a criminal matter
relating to the incarceration of such individual, from gross income.5 The
bill currently sits in the Committee on Ways and Means.5
2
Professor Adele Bernhard 53 makes an argument for a more
uniform compensation scheme within the several states.54 Professor
Bernhard argued that "a legislative remedy is the only reliable and
fair response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of
the operation of a criminal justice system as large as ours."55 She
further stated that the state whose official actions have put
individuals in prison for crimes they did not commit owes a debt to
those who have lost many years and opportunities.56 Accordingly,
she opined that the debt should be recognized and paid.57 For states
that lack uniformity, one individual may receive a large sum of money
47. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2007).
48. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 78B-9-405 (2008).
49. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-195.10 (receipt of the award will act as a waiver of the right to
sue).
50. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 2.
51. Erb, supra note 1.
52. Wrongful Convictions Tax Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 4241, 112th Cong. (2012).
53. Professor Bernhard, Associate Professor at Pace University School of Law, also
happens to be married to Peter Neufeld, co-founder of the Innocence Project.
54. Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate
Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703,
707-08 (2004).
55. Id. at 708.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction,
6 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 74 (1999).
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while another may receive little or nothing for the same injustice. A
system that acts with such arbitrariness lacks integrity and contributes
to the difficulty of obtaining compensation.
Take, for instance, the case of Calvin Johnson, a college-educated
metro Atlanta man who was released in 1999 after spending sixteen
years in prison.58 DNA tests cleared him of rape charges, and the
media attention surrounding the case resulted in Johnson receiving a
compensation package of a local transit job, $500,000 from the state of
Georgia, and an apology from the district attorney who prosecuted
his case.5 9 Contrast this with the case of Sam Scott and Douglas
Echols, both also from Georgia, who, a few years later, were cleared
of a 1986 rape conviction by DNA evidence.60 Scott and Echols
received no compensation.6' No one filed lawsuits, nor did any
senator volunteer to introduce special bills on their behalf.62 What
accounts for these differences? It appears that without a good face
and a heart-wrenching story the media attention just is not there.
Without the support of the media, political figures may be reluctant
to take on the political risks and capital that is required when
advocating for the wrongfully convicted. The disparities that go
along with compensating the wrongfully convicted motivates
Bernhard's argument that statutes should create a uniform approach
to compensating the unjustly convicted.63
While a uniform approach for compensating the wrongfully
convicted may alleviate some of the issues, there appears to be a lack
of incentive to streamline this effort. By expanding the compensation
scheme to include both judicial and extrajudicial professionals, a more
holistic and beneficial system would arise addressing concerns that
cannot be corrected with money alone. The impact of not receiving
compensation will be discussed further in Part III, but before reaching
that point it is important to explore the different paths through which
the exonerated can currently seek relief.
58. Bernhard, supra note 54, at 709.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Bill Torpy, Free Men, Lost Identities, DNA Cleared Them, but Prison Left
Mark, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST. (Oct. 5, 2003), http://www.prisontalk.com/forums/arch
ive/index.php/t-28172.html.
63. Bernhard, supra note 54, at 708.
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II. The Path to Freedom
Statutes that provide for some form of compensation for the
wrongfully convicted are in place in 30 states plus Washington, D.C.,
64
however, getting the compensation itself is just half the battle. Each
state's path to a prisoner receiving compensation has its own unique
challenges that add to the difficulty of renewed freedom. As previously
noted in Part I, many state statutes impose additional restrictions and
limitations on whom among those exonerated qualify for compensation
under the applicable scheme. The process of exoneration is daunting in
and of itself, and more often than not proves to be a losing battle.6' Even
for those defendants who are exonerated, the uphill battle only gets
steeper as the fight for a second chance at life begins post-exoneration.
The following subsections explore the three main paths for which
exonerees endeavor to seek redress for their time spent wrongfully
incarcerated and the institutional barriers that are inherently associated
with each.
A. State Statutes
Professor Bernhard is among those who argue that state statutes
should be the preferred avenue for obtaining post exoneration relief
and compensation. 66  While recognizing that many state statutes
contain language essentially disqualifying a number of those who have
been exonerated, Bernhard suggests a uniform approach to
compensation as the most simple, clear, and effective method if done
in the right way.67 The remedy, she claims, is inexpensive and therefore
does not require the creation of new bureaucratic agencies.
68
Furthermore, such "statutes bring rationality to a situation that can
otherwise be more akin to a lottery or popularity contest."
69
Compensation statutes are comparatively easy to use and, in an
ideal situation with a well-crafted statute, they resolve claims
rapidly.70 Consider for example, the case of Larry David Holdren,
who obtained permission to retest the forensic evidence material used
in his conviction, which proved that he was not responsible for the
64. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 2.
65. See id.
66. Bernhard, supra note 54, at 707-08.
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 709.
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crime charged.7 His conviction was later reversed and the indictment
against him dismissed.72 He brought a claim under West Virginia's
compensation statute and, after reading Holdren's uncontested
petition, the court concluded that the state was liable for the wrongful
conviction.73 After the court's ruling, the only issue left to decide was
the amount of damages, which the court determined to be $1.65
million, based on the expert testimony of an economist. 74 As Professor
Bernhard observed, while some might contend that the award was too
low, this allowed Holdren to recover relatively quickly and prevented
him from having to finance complicated litigation.75 He was not
required to obtain a pardon, which might have been impossible. 6
Finally, the damages, while not copious provided a foundation upon
which Holdren could begin to build a new life.77
Stories like Larry Holdren's illustrate the relative ease that state
statutes can provide for exonerees seeking to remedy the damages
caused by their wrongful conviction. Provided that exonerees meet
the base standards and qualifications under their respective statute,
ideally the path to receiving compensation should be less onerous
than the other alternatives.
The state statute approach, however, presupposes that the
individual who has been exonerated is able to meet the requirements of
the statute. This includes individuals like Jeffery Rodriguez, who spent
more than five years in a Santa Clara County, California, jail before being
declared factually innocent of the crime.78 When Rodriquez applied for
compensation from the state of California, a three-person state panel
denied his request.79
Under California Penal Code sections 4900 through 4906, the
claimant is required to prove the facts set forth in the statement
constituting the claim, including: (1) the fact that the crime he or she
was charged with was either not committed at all or at least not
committed by him or her; and (2) he or she sustained a pecuniary injury
71. Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461 slip op. (W. Va. Ct. Cl. Apr. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/joint/court/decisions/CC-00-191.htm.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Bernhard, supra note 54, n.40.
74. Holdren, No CC-00-461.
75. Bernhard, supra note 54, at 710.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Marie C Baca, Wrongly Convicted Face Uphill Battle to Obtain Compensation, CALIFORNIA
WATCH (Mar. 5,2011), http://calfforniawatch.org/public-safety/wrongly-convicted-face-uphill-
battle-obtain-compensation-9014.
79. Id.
Summer 2015]
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
due to the erroneous conviction and subsequent imprisonment.80
However, the California Victim Compensation and Government
Claims Board (hereinafter "Board") will deny compensation claims if it
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant pled guilty
in order to protect another from prosecution.
8
'
Section 4904 of the Code articulates that the Board will report the
facts of the case and its conclusions to the next Legislature, including
recommendations that the Legislature make appropriations for the
purpose of indemnifying the claimant.8 2 The appropriation is to equal
$100 per day of incarceration and cannot be treated as gross income
for tax purposes. 3
Much of the controversy surrounding these panel decisions is
how the board interprets the preponderance of evidence standard of
proof.84 When a former inmate files a claim with the board 5 it is
assigned to a hearing officer who determines whether the claim
should move forward. If the claim advances, the officer schedules a
hearing and creates a report, which is reviewed by the chief counsel
and presented to the board. Since the claim does not constitute a
criminal proceeding, legal counsel is not provided for those who
cannot afford to hire an attorney.
8 7
In opposition to state compensation statutes, Edwin Borchard
"argues that when the state administers its justice system, to err is not
illegal ... if an innocent individual is by mistake convicted, this is a
burden which, as a citizen of the State, he must bear; where there was
an intentional wrong or illegality, the law does give wrongfully
convicted individuals redress." 88 In another similar argument against
compensation statutes it is said that the state, acting lawfully, can
legally injure no one, and without fault there is no liability to
compensate false positives.89 This position, however, has been
80. Baca, supra note 78; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (2014).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(c) (2014).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (2014).
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (2014).
85. The California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board is a State-run
agency. In most cases, a person who is considering suing the State is required to first seek
an administrative remedy with the Government Claims Program. For more information
on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board visit their website.
About the Board, CA.GOV, http://vcgcb.ca.gov/board (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
86. Baca, supra note 78.
87. Id.
88. Elina Tetelbaum, Remedying a Lose-Lose Situation: How "No Win, No Fee" Can
Incentivize Post-Conviction Relief for the Wrongly Convicted, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 301, 320-21
(2010).
89. Id. at 321-22.
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criticized as being outdated and supplanted by decades of doctrinal
developments within the law.90 However outdated these arguments
are, their influence still exists. The difficulty of first obtaining and
retaining legal counsel that is good enough to navigate and wrangle
through the morass of legal and administrative red tape, may be key
to getting the full benefit of the justice system. In Tetelbaum's article,
she notes Joseph King's criticism of the inadequacies of fault-based
remedies and the uncertain nature of private congressional bills.9'
However, King also urged that the statutory schemes of strict
government liability become the necessary solution and that a no-
fault liability system be put into place because "if compensation is to
wait on culpable acts giving rise to a cause of action in tort for
damages, many erroneous confinements will go unremedied."
92
B. Civil Lawsuits
For individuals who do not meet the base requirements for
compensation under their state statutes, and for those residing within
a state that provides no compensation at all, the second most common
avenue for relief is through tort and civil rights law suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.9' While civil lawsuits are a common means of seeking
redress, in this context it presents its own host of obstacles. For starters,
the right to counsel is only provided for defendants in a criminal trial.94
Conversely, this means that exonerees are required to front the bill for
obtaining legal representation on a chance that they may succeed in
being awarded damages in a civil suit. This, in all likelihood, will be
impossible for indigent exonerees and their families, who may have
already exhausted all their resources to obtain the exoneration in the
first place; not to mention the onerous process of seeking out the limited
number of pro bono attorneys that may have other priorities. Another
barrier to compensation are state tort statutes of limitations. These
generally provide a two to three year period for a claim to be filed,
starting to toll after the initial injury (e.g., the conviction), which accrue
90. Tetlebaum, supra note 88, at 322.
91. Id. (citing Joseph H. King, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confused by the State,
1118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1091, 1112 (1970)).
92. Id. (citing Joseph H. King, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confused by the State,
1118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1091, 1096 (1970)).
93.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972)
(finding that counsel must be appointed in any case resulting in a sentence of actual
imprisonment).
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when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the tortuous act.95
Individuals who pursue their claims for compensation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 face yet another obstacle in that a state cannot be sued
for damages, in either state or federal court, unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity and subjected itself to suit.96 As a
result, even if the wrongful conviction came about as a result of one
or more state employees' activities, the state itself could not be sued
and plaintiffs would need to seek relief from individual state actors
who often lack sufficient financial resources.97 However, cities and
other municipal entities do not enjoy the same protections and
therefore are not immunized from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, so they can
be found liable for the activities of their employees, so long as those
activities were both unconstitutional and performed in accordance
with the custom or policy of the municipality. 98 Furthermore, the
doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity protect individual
officials from personal suit. Indeed, most state officials who find
themselves defending themselves against section 1983 suits are
entitled to raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, which
protects them from liability for any damages caused by the violation
of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.99
Among those who present the fiercest opposition to those seeking
exoneration and compensation are the prosecutors who obtained the
convictions. It may seem odd that an official charged with doing justice
can become such an obstacle to exoneration when confronted with
evidence of actual innocence. Prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction
claims of innocence seems to have a major effect on post exoneration
compensation, since in the first instance factual innocence must be
established. Without this first step of prosecutorial cooperation in the
face of exculpatory evidence, courtroom doors remain closed to those
seeking redress.
Law professor Daniel Medwed examined the question of why
prosecutors may turn a blind eye to post-conviction allegations of
innocence, and how certain institutional and political barriers deter
district attorneys' offices from recognizing potentially valid claims.'00
Among the institutional factors that contributed to the reluctance of
95. Tetelbaum, supra note 88, at 318-19.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Bernhard, supra note 54, at 723.
97. Bernhard, supra note 54, at 723-24.
98. Id. at 724.
99. Kit Kinsports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions,
23 GA. L. REV. 597, 600-01 (1989).
100. Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims
of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004).
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some prosecutors to accept claims of innocence were the heavy
emphasis district attorneys' offices place on conviction rates and the
professional incentives to obtain and maintain their convictions. 0'
One's "win rate" may be determinative of future success, and both the
individual prosecutor and the office as a whole have an interest in
maintaining the legitimacy of past convictions. 02 Taken together with
the psychological and personal barriers for prosecutors confronting
post-conviction innocence claims, those seeking post-conviction
compensation must first overcome the egocentric personae that infest
so many district attorneys' offices.0 3
Evidence suggests that prosecutors have agreed to DNA testing
in less than 50% of the cases in which such testing resulted in
exoneration.'04 Some prosecutors have opposed these claims, despite
the presence of exculpating evidence, including the DNA testing.'05
Other prosecutors have attempted to undermine potential post-
conviction litigation by destroying biological evidence or encouraging
defendants to waive their rights to preserve evidence.0 6
As a preliminary matter, the vision of prosecutor as minister of
justice runs counter to the actual measure of success imposed on
prosecutors in many district attorney offices. Those with the highest
conviction rates and therefore also reputations as the best performers,
have the greatest chance for advancement. 1 7 Although individual
prosecutors do not have explicit financial incentives for procuring
convictions,'0 8 there are inducements implicit in a system that makes
promotions contingent upon on one's ability to obtain convictions. 0 9
Furthermore, office-wide conviction rates may be used as leverage in
gaining resource concessions from the government in budget
negotiations with the government." 10 This is criticized because many
cases are resolved through plea bargaining and the cases that actually
go to trial are weak to begin with. 1"
101. Medwed, supra note 100, at 134.
102. Id. at 134-36.
103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. at 129.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 135.
108. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 537, 540-41 (1996); see generally Tracey L. Meares, Rewards
for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).
109. Medwed, supra note 100, at 135.
110. Id.
111. Id. at n.95.
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As observed by Tetelbaum, there have been several proposals for
increasing the accessibility of post-conviction relief." 12 She explains
that a major shortcoming of these proposals is that they overlook how
most incarcerated individuals are unable to obtain counsel for their
post-conviction claims." 3 States are not obligated by the Federal
Constitution to Trovide counsel for collateral attacks, even in death
penalty cases.' Given the onerous task and the relatively small
reward, many lawyers lack the monetary incentive to represent clients
seeking post-exoneration compensation. Even in cases where
compensation is probable, there is currently not enough economic
incentive for private attorneys to zealously pursue post-conviction
relief for wrongfully convicted individuals." 5
A big contributor to the lack of economic incentive are the caps
many state compensation statutes put on damages. When damages
are capped, so are contingency fees. This simultaneously deters
private lawyers from taking on post-exonerations cases on a
contingency fee basis and incentivizes a strictly hourly compensation
scheme, which is likely cost-prohibitive for most exonerees1"6
Comparing post-exoneration compensation caps to the valuation of
medical malpractice claims, a number of lawyers stated that they
would not take a low-value medical malpractice case even if there
were obvious malpractice." 7 One lawyer explained, "We don't take
low value medical malpractice cases because the damages may not be
of a size that we can dedicate the office forces to handling that kind of
case. You just can't stop the world and handle a $25,000 malpractice
case. You just can't do it.""'8 This lawyer estimated his office expends
$60,000 in out of pocket expense in a malpractice case. "9 Comparing
this formula to the context of post-conviction compensation claims, it
is easy to see how caps on damages make it unlikely that a
contingency fee arrangement would be worth an attorney's efforts
when there is more to lose than can be gained.
112. Tetelbaum, supra note 88, at 305.
113. Id.
114. See Murray v. Giarratano, 429 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987) (declining to extend a federal constitutional right to counsel to a convicted
person pursuing a discretionary direct appeal).
115. Tetelbaum, supra note 88, at 306.
116. Id.
117. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 659 (2006).
118. Id. at 660.
119. Id.
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C. Private Congressional Bills and Executive Pardons
For those exonerees unable to pursue judicial remedies for post-
conviction compensation, the final option is commonly to have a
legislator introduce a private compensation bill. These "moral
obligation" bills are specially drafted acts generally used to pay
otherwise unenforceable claims on behalf of individuals harmed by
the state.12° While an exoneree that pursues compensation through a
private bill avoids the legal immunities that protect government
actors, this can present a "tougher row to hoe."' 2 ' Where these bills
have been passed, amounts have ranged from $1,600 to nearly
$300,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. 122 However, according
to the Innocence Project, only 9% of the more than 240 people who
have been exonerated through DNA testing received compensation
through private bills, making it the least likely remedy for the
wrongfully convicted. 12
3
James Calvin Tillman is among the lucky few who benefited from
a successful private bill initiative. 24  Tilman was not so lucky,
however, when one night in January 1988, he was taken into police
custody on the charge of rape. 125 A case of mistaken identify led to
the wrongful conviction of Tillman, whereby he spent the next 16
years of his life behind bars for a crime he had not committed. 26 In
1990 Tillman arranged to have stains from the woman's pantyhose
and dress tested, but DNA testing at the time was not advanced
enough to get a conclusive result.'27 With the help of updated
technology, Tillman's conviction was finally vacated in 2006 based on
DNA evidence.' 28 Tillman was released, making him the first person
in Connecticut to be exonerated through the use of post-conviction
DNA testing. 129 At the time, Connecticut did not have a compensation
120. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 93 (1999).
121. Evan J. Mandery, Amy Shlosberg, Valerie West, & Bennett Callaghan, Compensation
Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 553, 558 (2013).
122. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED ENDURE AND How TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 13 (2009).
123. Id.
124. Giovanna Shay, What We Can Learn About Appeals From Mr. Tillman's Case: More
Lessons From Another DNA Exoneration, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2009).
125. Id. at 1511-12.
126. James Tillman, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-
false-imprisonment/james-tillman (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
127. Id.
128. Shay, supra note 124, at 1501.
129. Id.
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statute for the wrongfully convicted, leaving Tillman out on his
own. 30 In 2007, however, the Connecticut state legislature approved
a private bill awarding Tillman $5 million in compensation for the
injustice that he suffered.'3 '
Many, including Professor Bernhard, believe that the private bills
are an inadequate solution for wrongfully convicted individuals.'
32
Some states even interpret their constitutions to forbid the use of such
legislative acts, eliminating the private bill as an option.
133
Additionally, the success of any such private bill depends more on the
political connection of the person introducing the bill and the political
climate of the day than on the merits of the case.' 34 Often, the process
can be lengthy and the outcome uncertain.' 35 Finally, once passed, a
private bill must be signed into law by the governor, and it has been
observed that gubernatorial treatment of such legislation has never
been consistent. 136
Arguably, the disparity that takes place within the states make it
so that each individual method on its own is ill suited for such a
serious problem. State governments would benefit from a centralized
inter-branch taskforce charged with the responsibility of seeing to the
needs of those who have been wrongfully convicted and exonerated.
Once a victim has succeeded in meeting the perverse burden of
proving their innocence, the response to cure this injustice should
begin immediately. The most effective way would be to establish a
coalition taskforce comprised of individuals who can mount a claim
on behalf of the exoneree. By establishing an administrative entity
that would include judicial, executive, and legislative advocates, the
political process is removed from the conflict, enabling the focus to
remain with the exoneree as they transition back into society. Ideally,
deferential authority would be given to this agency in an effort to
avoid the procedural red tape that plagues each branch-specific
avenue of compensation analyzed above. Given the relatively low
instances for which an individual is actually declared innocent after
being wrongfully convicted, the cost to the state or federal
130. Shay, supra note 124, at 1503.
131. Id.; Connecticut Legislature Awards $5 Million to Exoneree, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT
(May 21, 2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/connecticut-
legislature-awards-5-million-to-exoneree.
132. Bernhard, supra note 120, at 94.
133. Id.; see also id. at n.85 (citing to state constitutions and case law demonstrating
prohibitions in Oregon, Oklahoma, New Jersey, and Texas).
134. Id. at 94.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 96.
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government to establish these types of agencies would be minimal.
Now returning to James Tillman, even though the bars were
gone, it took some time for him to get used to his newfound
freedom.'37 The process of readjustment was made all the more easier
because of the financial leverage he now had in facing the challenges
of reentry and returning home.'38 For all too many, however, the right
to return home is just half the battle. Once released, new challenges
present themselves as exonerees learn the hard way that freedom is
not free of all cost.
III. Returning Home and the Challenges Of Reentry
As Joan Petersilia remarks in the introduction of her book When
Prisoners Come Home, "[o]ne of the most profound challenges facing
American society is the reintegration of the more than 600,000 adults-
about 1,600 a day-who leave state and federal prisons and return
home each year." '39 The wrongfully convicted face a unique challenge
as they return home, often in a position worse than that of a person who
was legitimately convicted. Exonerees face the paradox of being
innocent and yet ineligible for post-release programs that often
accompany parole. 40  Since exonerees, in most cases, have been
declared factually innocent, they are released back into their
communities with no further assistance from the state.' 4' Ironically,
factually guilty parolees also get the benefit of post-release programs,
such as skills training, and drug and addiction support to aid their
reintegration.142 This Part of the Note explores the challenges of reentry
that are unique to those who have been wrongfully incarcerated and
released back into the outside community. They face the same
predicament almost all post-release individuals encounter, however
with the added hardship of being innocent and thereby ineligible for
typical resources and avenues set aside for reentry support.
137. Matthew Engelhardt, Living With Conviction: The James Tillman Story, GOODWIN
MAGAZINE 12 (Spring 2011), http:/www.goodwin.edu/pdfs/GC Magazine 2011Spring_
WebVersion.pdf.
138. See generally id.
139. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 3 (2003).
140. See Support the Exonerated, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
free-innocent/social-work (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
141. See id.
142. See id.
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A. Compensation and its Effect on Recidivism
In 2002, a participant on a panel hosted by the Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority spoke about the lack of assistance the
criminal justice system provided, explaining that:
Nothing was available when I walked out of prison.
Absolutely nothing - we received no assistance at all.
That was why I was in such a hurry, so anxious to find a
job. I wanted to re-establish that I could support myself.
To see that the state showed no interest at all in our
plight, I had no choice but to try to . . . we started to
promote ourselves, using different avenues to promote
ourselves to get assistance from whatever organization
would be willing to assist us. The state of Illinois gave
us no assistance at all, until we had to go to court, go
through legal procedures. It just didn't seem like it was
the just thing to do in a civilized society. 143
In 2013, the authors of Criminology: Compensation Statutes and
Post-Exoneration Offending have stated:
The universe of people who have been convicted and later
absolved of a crime is small, and those who receive
compensation comprise an even smaller subset of that
group .... Research on prison releasees suggests that
exonerees are potentially at a high risk for offending
following their release. Though they are innocent of the
charges for which they were incarcerated, there is no
reason to think that they are immune from the detrimental
effect that prison has on prisoners. It is well established
that prison can habituate criminal behavior. 1
44
While the authors conceded that data has not been collected on
how exonerees are impacted by prison, they found support in the
abundant research on how prisons can act as a school for crime. 145
The inclination of criminal behavior, coupled with the lack of
143. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY THE NEEDS OF THE
WRONGFULLY CONVIcTED: A REPORT ON A PANEL DISCUSSION 3 (2002), available at http://
www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/Needs.pdf.
144. Mandery et al., supra note 121, at 554.
145. Id. at n.4.
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services available to exonerees, creates a high risk for exonerees to
commit crimes, landing them back into prison. Data shows that the
average time exonerees spent wrongfully incarcerated was more
than thirteen years, 4 6 advancing the theory that exonerees are at a
substantial risk for post-release offending. 4 7
Post-exoneration compensation, however, seems to have a
positive effect on reentry into the community. Exonerees who are
compensated above a threshold amount of $500,000 commit offenses
at a significantly lower rate than those who are either not
compensated or compensated beneath the threshold level. 148 One
study shows that those exonerees who received compensation were
less likely to commit a post-exoneration offense, suggesting that
compensation has a positive effect on exonerees the more they are
compensated, the less likely they are to offend after exoneration. 49
B. How the Prison Effect Curtails Reentry
It just didn't seem fair that after you take [eighteen]
years of a person's life and you think now you can send
them out into the world and everything's going to be all
right because now they have their freedom? Yeah,
freedom is very important but you also have to have a lot
of different things set up for people .... You have to have
programs for people who are wrongfully convicted
because there are a number of people wrongfully
convicted-here is a panel of people wrongfully
convicted - so why isn't there anything in place right now
in the state of Illinois to help the wrongfully convicted
after they are exonerated and freed? 5°
People exiting prison need, but often do not have, physical and
mental health care, education, food, housing, jobs, and a support
network.'' Exonerees may not qualify for ex-offender services because
they are technically not ex-offenders or parolees.5 2 Thus, exonerees
cannot take advantage of prerelease counseling, job training, substance
abuse treatment, housing assistance, and have no go-to person, that
146. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 2.
147. Mandery et al., supra note 121, at 555.
148. Id. at 556.
149. Id. at 572.
150. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, supra note 143, at 2.
151. See Burnett, supra note 10, at 274.
152. Mandery et al., supra note 121, at 578.
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parolees commonly receive.'53 Typically, released exonerees receive no
more than clothing for the day, a bus ticket, and what is called gate
money, which generally ranges from $10 to $150, to reenter society, find
employment, and begin their lives anew.
154
In a roundtable panel discussion and report prepared for Illinois
Governor George Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment, among
the recognized needs of reentering exonerees included the need for:
immediate assistance upon release from prison, counseling, emergency
funding to help them get back on their feet, and overcoming anger and
distrust of the criminal justice system. 1'55 Illinois is among the minority
of states who provide post-exoneration support services along with
monetary compensation. 5 6 In 2004, Massachusetts became the first
state to create such a statutory scheme, offering compensation up to
$500,000 and allowing courts to grant, in their discretion, state services
that are reasonable and necessary to address any deficiencies in the
individual's physical and emotional condition as a result of his or her
erroneous conviction and resulting incarceration. 1
57
Among the biophysical and tangible needs exonerees require, the
psychological demands of the wrongfully convicted can pose even
more of a challenge. The clinical findings of psychiatric assessments
indicate prevalent and often severe mental health and adjustment
problems.'58 After release, most men were described by their families
and others as changed in personality, and displaying features of post-
traumatic stress disorder.'59 They displayed additional difficulties in
psychological and social adjustment, particularly in close
relationships. 160 What is most interesting about the Grounds article is
the suggestion that those who have been wrongfully convicted face
psychological challenges that are uniquely tied to the wrongful
conviction itself. 16 1  The available accounts that describe the
153. See Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and
Justice is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
11/25/us/25 dna.html.
154. Mandery et al., supra note 121, at 578.
155. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, supra note 143, at 2, 3-6.
156. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 122, at 28.
157. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 5 (2004); see also Massachusetts, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-state-doing/MA (last visited Apr. 5,
2015); see also Nebraska, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-
your-state-doing/NE (Nebraska offering $500,000 in compensation beginning in 2009) (last
visited Apr. 5, 2015).
158. Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 2 (2005).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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psychological effects of wrongful conviction and imprisonment are
predominantly biographical or autobiographical accounts given by
individuals through books, television documentaries, and media
interviews, many contain graphic descriptions of difficulties in
adjustment and coming to terms with what happened.'62 An account
from one participant in the study conducted by Rimer and Simon
explained that:
Life is sort of messed up right now. I feel like I'm in prison
right now. My wife would ask me: "Where are you going?
When are you going to be home?" It was like she was the
warden. Chronologically, I'm thirty-seven; psychologically
and most of the time I'm older than that. But sometimes, like
when I go out, I'm only twenty-five years old-I didn't lose
those twelve years; they took those years. My point of view
is that when you have time like that taken from you and
come back into society, what is so called normal society, you
tend to automatically go back to that age you left behind.
You're living at the age again, ryou're catching up to the
world, it's like life has stopped. 6
These forms of psychological trauma underpin the unique
challenges that exonerees face when they reenter society. These severe
reactions often could not be attributed to preexisting conditions, because
evidence indicated that they occurred in exonerees with normal and
stable personalities.' 64 Rather, these reactions were caused by external
traumatic events.' 65 Exonerees who have become accustomed to the
prison regime find it even more difficult to cope with the drastic changes
that confront them upon release. Adaptation to prison has made it
difficult for some individuals to tolerate living in a household where
others moved their possessions and household items. 66  Current
technology is foreign, and with that comes humiliation, self-
consciousness, fear, and regression. One man described how he would
eat food cold because he did not know how to use a microwave.167
Another, when shopping in town, used to push people out of the way,
and when queuing at a checkout, he could not tolerate people standing
behind him and would sometimes leave his shopping cart and walk
162. Grounds, supra note 158, at 11.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 30.
167. Id. at 29.
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out.168 Overall, it appeared that these psychological and adjustment
difficulties were due to the injustice of their wrongful conviction and
long-term imprisonment. 169
IV. Looking Forward to Change
Cathleen Burnett posited an alternative approach to the current
wrongful conviction compensation schemes and restorative justice
framework, and proposed to put, in its place, an extrajudicial
approach grounded in the executive branch's responsibility to
provide for the administration of justice.7 0 Howard Zehr offered five
restorative justice questions for helping to craft a solution to the harms
sustained by those wrongfully convicted: "(1) Who has been hurt? (2)
What are their needs? (3) Whose obligations are these? (4) Who has
a stake in this situation? (5) What is the appropriate process in which
to involve stakeholders in an effort to put things right?"'
7
'
Who has been hurt? Under the first prong, it is suggested that the
entity, whether it be a governor, a parole board, a prosecutor, or a court
granting judicial relief, has the legal obligation of notifying the
individual that he or she qualifies for relief. 72 That same entity should
be allowed to declare actual innocence so that the exoneree would not
have to re-litigate the matter. 73 Going beyond notification to the
individual, that same entity should also be required to notify a state-
level office whenever a person is to be released due to any of the
innocence criteria for eligibility, creating a simple and efficient
administrative program to resolve the needs of the victims similar to
the federal model-the Victim Compensation Fund-devised to assist the
victims of the September 11 tragedy. 74 The Victim Compensation
Fund serves as a model by providing a no-fault alternative to litigation.
Under the Victim Compensation Fund program, the average payout
was about $1 million with money being made available to sustain the
victim while the review was taking place.1
75
What are their needs? It would first be important for a
restorative justice case worker to meet the individual being released
168. Grounds, supra note 158, at 59
169. Id. at 45.
170. Burnett, supra note 10, at 272-73.
171. Id. at 281.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 282.
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from prison, which would ideally take place before actual release.'7 6
This case worker would help the individual get set up in a foster home
or in an apartment, if family is not an appropriate initial destination,
and would generally be available to coordinate support services for
the former prisoner in addressing challenges.'77
Whose obligations are these? The social contract between
individuals and the community anticipates that since the government
acts as the representative of the entire community, it will provide a safety
net for those most needy. 7 8 The community has a responsibility to
support and help victims of crime to meet their needs; the community
bears a responsibility for the welfare of its members and the social
conditions and relationships that promote both crime and community
peace; the community has responsibilities to support efforts to integrate
offenders into the community, to be actively involved in the definitions
of offender obligations, and to ensure opportunities for offenders to
make amends.' Accordingly, the entire state shares responsibility for
remedying wrongful convictions.180
Who has a stake in this situation and what is the appropriate
process to involve stakeholders? This again would be a collaborative
effort among community members including family, criminal justice
personnel, service agency representatives, neighborhood association
members, crime victims, union officials, and education, religious, and
media representatives. 8' The plan formed by this collaborative effort
would be filed within 60 days of release, either with the secretary of
state or attorney general.'82
While traditional reentry programs are premised on the notion that
the participants committed crimes for which they were properly
convicted and served their time, exonerees post-release services should
be provided both as a means of ensuring successful reintegration and as
part of an effort to make whole exonerees who have been injured by
errors in the administration of the criminal justice system that led to their
wrongful conviction.'83 Massachusetts, as among the first states to
provide exoneration services in addition to monetary compensation, has
implicitly recognized that the loss should be borne by the community as
176. Burnett, supra note 10, at 282.
177. Id. at 283.
178. Id. at 284.
179. Id. at 284.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 286.
182. Id.
183. Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael D. Aufgang, Beyond Monetary Compensation: The Need
for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully Convicted, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105 (2008).
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a whole and not by the injured individual alone.184 Rather, it is the
obligation of the states to attempt to make exonerees "whole" by
providing access to meaningful services to address the negative impacts
of wrongful imprisonment on every aspect of their lives.
85
Unfortunately, simply making the reentry services that are already
in place for parolees available for exonerees is not a viable solution.
Prisoner reentry programs are largely inappropriate for individuals who
are actually innocent of the crimes for which they were imprisoned,
because the programs are generally premised on the notion that
participants were guilty of the crimes for which they were imprisoned;
these programs are often reminiscent of prison in their structured rules
and strict curfews, which are presumably intended to increase the
likelihood that parolees will not recidivate. 186  Although exonerees
experience many of the same symptoms of "institutionalization" and
other detrimental impacts of prison as other inmates, many of an
exoneree's needs and issues are completely distinct. 87
Hence, so as not to inflict further injury upon the wrongfully
convicted by forcing them into programs that are inappropriate and
only serve to remind them of the strictures of prison life, reentry
services for exonerees must be sensitive to the particular reintegration
issues and obstacles that face this population.' What may be lacking
in the Massachusetts statute' 89 is the fact that programs offered and
made available to post-conviction exonerees, are programs that already
exist and are available to the qualifying public at large. While the
existing compensation schemes like those that exist in Massachusetts,
Louisiana, and Vermont lead the charge by providing services in
addition to monetary compensation, a more individualized approach
tailored to the unique needs of the wrongfully convicted needs to take
center stage in redressing the harm that was done by the State. 9'
We can start by shifting the burden of proof in wrongful
conviction claims once it has been determined that an individual is
factually innocent. Plaintiffs in New York have the burden of proving
innocence by clear and convincing evidence.' 9 ' The Court of Appeals
184. Chunias & Aufgang, supra note 183, at 125.
185. Id. (Massachusetts statute providing a hearing process for expungement or seal
of records relating to the erroneous conviction).
186. Id. at 127.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2004).
190. Chunias & Aufgang, supra note 183, at 108; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 5(A)
(2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (2007).
191. Burnett, supra note 10, at 276.
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of New York discussed this requirement, observing that it places the
claimant in the difficult position of proving a negative.' 92 Instead of
further burdening the victim, a no-fault scheme should be put into
place, putting the burden on the state as to why an individual is not
qualified for compensation. A wrongful conviction administrative
agency should be mandated in every state to monitor and enforce
compensation as a per se matter of right. Greater emphasis should be
placed on individualized plans for reentry, using the restorative
justice model similarly suggested by Cathleen Burnett to better serve
the unique challenges that face those who have been wrongfully
convicted. Seeking a second chance should not be a chore. It is a right
that needs to be restored. The restoration of which should come from
the very hand that took it away.
Conclusion
In June 2013, Colorado become the latest state to provide
compensation to the wrongfully convicted via state statute. 93 The
Colorado legislature found that an innocent person who has been
wrongfully convicted of a felony has been uniquely victimized, has
distinct problems reentering society, has difficulty achieving legal
redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the
law, and should have an available means of redress beyond the existing
tort remedies to seek compensation for damages.' 94 In addition to the
monetary award, exonerees and their children become eligible for
tuition waivers at state institutions of higher education, and any child
support an exoneree accumulated during their incarceration are
similarly waived.'95
While compensation schemes like these offer a measure of relief to
those who have had their lives taken away, the lack of uniformity
among the fifty states does little to enhance the integrity of our criminal
justice system. When confronted with the error of convicting the wrong
person, instead of immediately seeking to undue the wrong, we have
seen how the process of exoneration contributes to the prolonged
struggle for a second chance at a stolen life. From the legal battles in
court that can take years to see results, to private congressional bills that
often require an exceptionally egregious wrong as a prerequisite, the
existing frameworks across the nation is grossly inadequate.
192. Burnett, supra note 10, at 276
193. H.B. 13-1230, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (enacted).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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